Introduction: Gender, Rights and Religion at the Crossroads by Tadros, Mariz
We are at a critical conjuncture in our
engagement with issues of religion, politics and
women’s equality – in particular in relation to
the so-called ‘Muslim world’. This is because of a
number of intersecting factors: a post-9/11 world
in which the international community has
adopted a dual approach of fighting terrorism
while also promoting a ‘religious’ approach in its
dealings with ‘the Muslim community’. Using
religion as an entry point to engaging the
‘Muslim world’ has entailed working with
religious leaders and faith-based organisations to
advance a progressive religious agenda,
supporting women who ground their activism in
a religious framework. Religion has also become
an important entry point in development policy
and practice in the light of the entrenchment of
neoliberal policies and the rise of identity
politics. Faith-based actors have been brought to
centre stage as providers of welfare services,
mediators of social change and as arbitrators in
administering justice. Some Western donors have
also espoused an agenda of engaging with
Muslim leaders while adopting a religious
framework for advancing human rights in
‘Muslim communities’. Islamic political and
social forces have simultaneously contributed to
a process of the Islamisation of society from
below. This IDS Bulletin questions what the
intersection of global, local and national politics
means for policy and practice in the realm of
religion and gender.
The articles in this issue explore how religion
has been used in an instrumental manner by
global, local and national actors as a means of
engaging with gender issues in Muslim
communities. The deployment of religion is
intended to achieve two gains: first, to advance a
‘progressive’ religious discourse in communities
where religion plays an important role in
people’s lives, and second, to adopt what is
considered a more culturally sensitive and
‘authentic’ approach to eliciting social reform.
International actors have deployed human rights
to advance security agendas, while many donors
have assumed religion as an entry point to elicit
social change. States have instrumentalised both
religion and secularism to deal with their
political opponents. Feminists, human rights
activists and development practitioners have
sought to form alliances with progressive clerics
and mobilise religious idioms, symbols, framings
and discourses to accommodate an all pervasive
religiosity in the society in which they work.
However, the various forms of instrumentalism
flagged here need to be set against the backdrop
of other contending discourses, which are deeply
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entangled in these political debates. These
include the use of women’s rights discourses by
Western governments to justify war (as with
Afghanistan) and the deployment of human
rights discourses by Islamist groups to legitimise
gender inequalities.
This issue of the IDS Bulletin brings together
scholars, scholar-activists and development
practitioners to share their analyses of the
critical challenges and opportunities that are
transforming their realities today. A workshop
convened at the Institute of Development
Studies (IDS) in September 2010 took the
debates further, leading to a series of
interventions, shared in this issue of the IDS
Bulletin. The country experiences shared here
include India (Nida Kirmani), Palestine (Islah
Jad), Turkey and Afghanistan (Deniz Kandiyoti),
Iran (Ziba Mir-Hosseini), UK (Pragna Patel) and
Egypt (Hania Sholkamy, Margot Badran, Mariz
Tadros and Yousry Moustafa).
The authors problematise a number of
overlapping tensions: international actors –
including donors who have engaged with gender,
human rights and religion through the prism of a
security agenda. States have presented themselves
as the bastions for defending secularism against
Islamism, while simultaneously presenting
themselves as the protectors of religion and
cultural authenticity. Feminists, social movements
and human rights activists have found themselves
forced to reconsider their strategies of
engagement as the normative framework in which
they work has become increasingly delineated by
religion. Moreover, many activists have found that
battles need to be fought over several fronts: on
the one hand, they have had to challenge the way
in which international human rights frameworks
have been applied with double standards, while on
the other, fight for the right at home to work
within multiple frameworks without having to
restrict themselves to the religious normative one.
1 International donors, women and religion: the
conundrums
Women and gender relations in Muslim societies
have always been a site of highly contested
political struggles, since the time of colonialism
(Said 1978). Yet as Abu-Lughod (2010: 32)
reminds us, ‘the new twists and turns in global
politics have also brought new forms of
intersection with gender representing one of the
most sensationalised issues on the current global
stage, entangled with military intervention and
transnational feminism, progressive foundations
and right-wing think tanks, elite careers and
welfare administration, literary commerce and
marginal lives’. For example, the debate between
liberal feminists who condoned military action in
Afghanistan on account of its violations of
women’s rights and the radical feminists who
condemned it as a form of ‘cultural imperialism’
served only to essentialise Afghan women further
(Kandiyoti, this IDS Bulletin). In this context, a
Western gender agenda was deployed to service
the security agenda with little impact on shifting
conditions on the ground. Kandiyoti postulates
that:
The workings of global governance
institutions (United Nations agencies in
particular) in the service of a gender equality
agenda in Afghanistan instituted a form of
donor-driven gender activism that could not
reach beyond the ministries in Kabul in a
country where the writ of the government
barely extended outside the capital. This
made the technocratic formula of ‘gender
mainstreaming’ politically hollow and ushered
in another layer of instrumentalism – this
time in the service of development and post-
conflict reconstruction.
The post-9/11 context was characterised by a
two-pronged approach: fighting terrorism
through security, and targeting ‘Muslims’ and
‘Muslim communities’ through sociocultural
interventions. Muslims, a group differentiated by
geography, language, cultural, political and
historical diversity was homogenised into the
‘Muslim community’, which had to be ‘engaged
with’ in order to promote human rights values
expressed in indigenous – read religious – terms
(see Balchin, this IDS Bulletin). Moustafa (this
IDS Bulletin) notes that when President Obama
visited Egypt in 2009, there was a firm focus on
his advisor, Ms Dalia Megahed (a veiled woman),
who accompanied him on this visit:
This was a symbolic gesture: engaging a veiled
woman is commonly associated with cross-
cultural interaction. Images of veiled girls are
widely used in promotional materials
circulated at conferences and other activities
sponsored and supported by the international
community to communicate with the Muslim
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‘world’. The process aims to illustrate the
positive presence of Islamic communities in
the international sphere, or positive outreach
by the international community to local
realities.
Donors’ annual reports and studies on
development aid now celebrate the image of the
veiled woman engaging in sports and education,
as culturally specific manifestations of liberation
expressed in a religious idiom. And it is not just
the donors and international organisations that
have joined the cause. An Egyptian feminist told
the following anecdote:1 she was sent to the USA
as part of a delegation of young activists where
she was asked by the US organisers to make an
intervention. She offered to talk about the status
of women in Egypt. The organisers decided
against it and instead chose another young
delegate, a veiled woman, to talk on the topic,
even though this was not remotely her area of
work or expertise. The justification was that the
veiled woman looked more ‘authentic’ and ‘less
westernised’.
Moustafa observes that there has been a
conspicuous shift in some donor priorities vis-à-
vis who and what to fund in the Middle East. He
notes that, while in the 1990s funding advocacy
for the realisation of political and civil rights was
in vogue; today, the focus has shifted towards
supporting cultural and religious initiatives.
Applications from grantees wanting to make a
good pitch for donor funding are increasingly
incorporating the participation of clergymen in
their funding proposals as partners and
stakeholders. ‘The message is clear:
sociopolitical reform can only be furthered
through negotiating the religio-cultural ... The
ability of these kinds of projects to integrate
clergymen has become an indicator of their
success’, suggests Moustafa. Sholkamy (2010)
argues that the fact that some donors have
approached religious engagement as an end in
itself, is cause for concern: it means that the goal
(gender justice) has been sacrificed as the focus
is on the religious pathway itself.
Donor communities’ engagement with citizens in
terms of their religious identities has had grave
consequences: other dimensions of identity
(political orientation, ethnicity, language, class)
are muted. Yet, as Balchin notes, the engagement
with citizens as if they only have one identity, the
religious, is congruent with the vision of radical
Islamist groups, who have also flagged religious
identity as the identifier of a Muslim Ummah – a
global nation encompassing all Muslims. Balchin
notes that approaches that privilege religion as the
developmental issue are in tune with the
Islamists’ assertion that Islam and Muslims
deserve ‘special treatment’. Yet, engaging through
religious clergymen for example, means that by
default, gender hierarchies privileging some
actors’ positions and roles are espoused. In the
Philippines, notes Balchin, local women activists
were sidelined and their reproductive health
initiatives undermined when donors invited local
clergymen to take part in the reproductive health
initiative and gave them central roles even in
areas where they were not the main decision-
makers. This led to the marginalisation of women
activists and the mobilisation of religious forces to
create counter-coalitions against their
reproductive health initiative.
2 States mobilising religion, human rights and
women
States have played a crucial role in mediating the
international agenda of combating terrorism and
‘engaging Muslim communities’ in their national
contexts. Patel’s article shows how, against a
backdrop of ‘the war on terror’, the British
government has pursued a series of domestic
policies aimed at accommodating religious
identity within public institutions. She argues
that the shift from a multicultural policy (as
problematic as it was) to a multi-faith policy has
only encouraged increasing communalisation of
South Asian populations in London. The
implications are an erosion of secular spaces,
spaces in which women who choose not to engage,
identify or interact on the basis of religious
identity, are marginalised. Institutionally, Patel’s
own organisation, the Southall Black Sisters
(SBS), which serves as a platform for engaging
minority women, was sidelined by the local
council. The adoption of a faith-based approach
to engage with minorities has become a political
resource used by the state and the religious right
in all communities leading in the same direction:
a de-secularisation process.
Yet another set of policies, not incongruent with
the above, have also relied on partnering with
religious authorities with severe consequences on
protecting women’s rights. The Muslim
Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) in the UK was set up
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and managed in accordance with the Arbitration
Act 1996, for alternative dispute resolution in
civil law cases, especially family cases in England.
Patel argues, in her article, that MAT is an
example of how it has widened the power base
and authority of patriarchal religious actors
whose verdicts have often discriminated against
women. Balchin too shows how a neoliberal
privatisation agenda stands to gain from relying
on the extra-judicial arbitration of family matters
under Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
legislation. It serves to reduce the case load
burden on the formal legal system, leaving it for
more ‘serious’ matters such as commercial
disputes. Balchin observes in her article, ‘The way
a great many ADR systems have worked to date
may well be more in tune with hegemonic local
cultural and religious norms than the formal
legal system, but they have far less often been in
tune with the poor’s aspirations for justice and
women’s aspirations for equality.’
The Palestinian National Authority, notes Jad, in
this IDS Bulletin, has always infused its
nationalist project with Islam but now in its
political struggle with Hamas, is deploying
religion in a more selective manner, suddenly
presenting itself as a defender of secularism in a
bid to thwart the Islamist movement.
3 The uses and abuses of religion and gender:
local perspectives
The case studies from India, Egypt and the UK
all point to the way that, faced with contexts in
which religion is playing an increasingly
prominent role in the lives of citizens or through
local and national political dynamics, activists
are increasingly adapting religion instrumentally
in order to advance their agendas. Kirmani
reflects on how the experiences of the Muslim
Women’s Rights Network (Muslim identity-
based) and the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila
Andolan (a secular organisation) attempt to
work with the highly conservative but influential
non-governmental organisation, the All India
Muslim Personal Law Board to produce a more
woman-friendly contract, produced mixed
results. On the one hand, these networks were
successful in questioning the authority of
religious institutions and showing the many
possible interpretations of Islam. Through their
campaigning efforts, the networks have widened
the space for debate about the relationship
between Islam and women’s rights and have
challenged the image of Muslim women as
passive victims. On the other hand, the goal of
encouraging women and men to use an
alternative religious contract has ultimately
failed, except in a handful of cases. Kirmani
suggests this is because, although the new
contract conformed to religious precepts, this
was not enough to elicit social transformation.
‘The fact that women are themselves hesitant to
claim their rights even if they are convinced that
[they are] sanctioned within Islam speaks to the
wider patriarchal structures that continue to
exist in Indian society, which religious concepts
alone cannot dismantle’, suggests Kirmani.
Sholkamy engages with the increasing use of
religious discourses and actors by social
movement activists, development practitioners
and donors in Egypt in order to advance their
social justice agendas. She finds this a disturbing
phenomenon because, ‘The promotion of religion
as a route to social justice may in the short-term
succeed but in the long-term will make religion
the arbitrator of politics and of social change’.
The first reason why this trend is disturbing is its
backlash potential. The use of religious texts to
substantiate women’s rights and freedoms may
seem as a way to speak to the increased religiosity
of people living in many contemporary societies
but, argues Sholkamy, for every progressive
narrative, there is a counter-narrative, which
although highly reactionary, bears much
resonance in the community. She suggests:
Religious texts are used to substantiate
women’s rights and freedoms. Female genital
mutilation, birth control, sexual rights and
rights to property and mobility, we are often
reminded, are addressed by Islamic codes that
favour women. Unfortunately, satellite
channels, popular books and even some
textbooks used in seminaries are not in
accordance with this progressive
interpretation. They are spreading a very
different rendition of religious teachings.
The second worrisome issue to emerge is that
this form of engaging through conformity to the
religious normative framework may only serve to
send out the message that only the religiously-
sanctioned is feasible and possible. All else based
on independent reason, that cannot be
religiously sanctioned, has no space or voice, she
concludes.
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Moreover, as Patel points out in her article,
£45 million was made available by the British
government for 2008–11 to local authorities to
tackle extremism among Muslims. In response,
Ealing Council’s Preventing Violent Extremism
fund was set up to engage only Muslims. In view of
this new direction of funding faith-based groups,
previously secular, black and minority
organisations refashioned themselves as Muslim
groups. Some faith-based organisations who do not
have progressive social justice agendas have been
strengthened through increased visibility and
access to funds. Concurrently, women’s multiple
identities are being condensed into that of being
Muslim, whether they are religious or not.
4 Islamic feminists, moderate Islamists and
situating human rights and women in policy and
practice
Women activists who have sought gender justice
through Islam are also at the crossroads. Islamic
feminists emerged in the 1990s, as a growing wave
of women started studying Islam through a
hermeneutics and historical approach. There is a
consensus that this is highly desirable in that
women need to break into this exclusively male
arena (see Kirmani, Badran and Mir-Hosseini in
this IDS Bulletin). It holds the potential, as
Sholkamy argues, of ‘feminising Islam’. A feminist
engagement through Islam some would argue, is a
political necessity in the light of the rise of political
Islam and its claims on being the sole legitimate
guardians of Islam. Mir-Hosseini asserts:
‘Islamic feminism’ – feminism that takes its
legitimacy from Islam – was the ‘unwanted
child’ of political Islam; it did not emerge
because the Islamists offered an egalitarian
vision of gender relations. They did not.
Rather, their agenda of ‘return to the Shari’a’
and their attempt to translate into policy the
patriarchal gender notions inherent in
classical jurisprudence, provoked women to
increase criticism of these notions and spurred
greater activism among secular feminists, who
were now international and had the legitimacy
of human rights on their side. The Islamists’
defence of patriarchal rulings as ‘God’s Law’
and as promoting an authentic and ‘Islamic’
way of life, brought the classical
jurisprudential texts out of the closet.
Zainah Anwar, founder of Sisters in Islam in
Malaysia and a founding member of the
transnational movement, Musawah, has taken a
similar stance, arguing that the only option to
fight the powers of the conservatives who have a
stronghold on making claims to being the
guardians of religion is to create counter-
movements. She notes that Musawah ‘would make
it their business to challenge the use of religion
and culture to undo advances in human rights and
women’s rights’. Anwar (2009) argues that:
When Islam is used as a source of law and
public policy, then all citizens must have the
right to speak on the subject, Muslims or non-
Muslims, secularists or Islamists. Public law
and policy must necessarily be open to public
debate, and pass the test of public reason. No
one demands that you have a degree in political
science or economics or social studies before
you can talk about politics, economics or social
ills. We are deemed qualified to comment
simply because we live these realities. But
when it comes to talking about Islamic laws,
qualifications suddenly become indispensable.
We must hold a degree in Islamic studies, we
must be able to speak Arabic. Once you’ve
jumped through these hoops, a new condition is
set: the hijab. And when we wear the hijab,
their masterstroke is delivered – they say our
ideas are against Islam.
However, what is debated here is not the critical
role of Islamic feminists in Koranic exegesis but
the extent to which they can influence gender
policy and practice. Do they have the power to
influence through a feminist engagement with
jurisprudence? Proponents suggest they do, as is
evident in the case of the reform of Moroccan
family law and the introduction of a woman’s
right to khul.2 Counter-arguments are that it was
not the presentation of alternative
interpretations that tilted the balance in favour
of policy reform, but politics – in both cases, the
political will of the powers that be. If the pathway
to policy reform is through Koranic exegesis, it
follows that the struggles are over contending
interpretations of texts. However, the struggle
seems to be political – between contending
interests on a national and international level. In
the reform of the Mudawanna, it was not the
discovery of a progressive interpretation to the
texts that suddenly earned the proposed family
law political buy-in, despite the fact that King
Hussein II had consistently made the argument
that the proposed reforms are commensurate
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with Islam. According to political activist Nabila
Mourad, women activists and progressive factions
within the government had been advocating for
change for years but the regime feared a backlash
from the opposition and hence had waited. The
right moment came in 2004 shortly after the
Casablanca terrorist bombings of 2003, which
had strengthened the government’s position vis-à-
vis the Islamist factions.3 In the introduction of
the khul’ article in the Egyptian Personal Status
Procedural Law in 2000, what convinced the
majority of MPs from the ruling party in Egypt to
vote in its favour was not the government line
that it derived from Islam, rather it was the
threat of losing their political backing from the
ruling party if they dare to vote against the
proposed article (Tadros 2010).
Badran acknowledges (in this IDS Bulletin) that
Islamic feminist movements have enriched the
landscape of women’s activism, but she
expressed concern with the way in which the
agency and framing of Islamic feminists tend to
fall short of being inclusive of those who do not
espouse a Muslim identity or who do not wish to
engage through a religious framework. Concern
for the inclusiveness of the two Muslim networks
under study in India was also voiced by Kirmani
in her article in this issue. In return, Mir-
Hosseini suggests that Musawah is indeed open
to those who espouse a secular framework of
engagement even if led by Muslim women.
What becomes evident from the emerging
debates is that it is as much about who is
engaging as what they are engaging with. Women
activists are very aware that historical
trajectories, contexts, identities and their own
positionalities play an immense role in their
ability to withstand attacks from the opposition,
and to hold sufficient credibility in the contexts
in which they work, to be of influence.
5 Beyond the binaries and the polemic
One of the clear messages that emerged from
the IDS workshop and the articles featured here,
is that the current scholarly approach to the
study of gender and religion is wanting – because
it is locked in a binary framework of secularism
vs religion, modernity vs tradition and moderates
vs extremists. As suggested by Kandiyoti, we
need new lenses to engage with the complexities
of the politics of gender. New lenses however,
need the deconstruction of the old, and greater
conceptual clarity over what is meant by the
religious and the secular.
The dichotomisation of states, political forces,
actors and strategies of engagement as either
‘secular’ or ‘religious’ conceals multiple and
complex ways in which both intertwine, intersect
and overshadow each other.
Jad’s analysis in this IDS Bulletin, of the historical
emergence of the post-colonial Arab state shows
how, despite seeming secular, the nationalist
governments often used religion to prop up their
legitimacy and secure populist support. She
reminds us that whereas in the West, de jure
secularism called for the formal separation of the
church and the state, the Arab state recognised
Islam as the religion of society, but de facto
demobilised its political use by thwarting
organised Islamic movements. The nationalist
ideology espoused – whether Baathist, Nasserite
or other regime type – distinguished itself from
socialism by drawing on Islam. Hence, the whole
discourse of secular Arab states fighting Islamism
is highly problematic, given the assumptions
about the relationship between the state and
religion it conceals.
Patel’s article on the politics of the UK
government espousing multi-faithism in lieu of
multiculturalism exposes the fragility of the idea
of an allegedly secular state when policy and
practice are being increasingly infused with
religion, driven by security agendas.
The dichotomy between a secular feminist and
an Islamic/Muslim feminist also needs to be
scrutinised in the light of the shifts in strategies
of engagement. Secular feminists are
increasingly using religious framings, texts and
idioms in mediating the meanings of
international human rights conventions (such as
the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women) to conservative
audiences (Sholkamy, Moustafa, Mir-Hosseini,
this IDS Bulletin). Likewise, women activists who
belong to Islamist movements are increasingly
using human rights discourses to substantiate
their claims to gendered delegation of rights
(Tadros, this IDS Bulletin).
Moreover, coalitions are also being forged between
so-called ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ actors united by
common political interests. For example, a survey
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undertaken by the Association for Women’s Rights
in Development (AWID) indicated that in Latin
America, one of the top five most significant
strategies of engagement for highly conservative
religious forces is to establish alliances with the
secular right. A displacement in religious activism
has resulted in religious leaders and discourses
being increasingly paired with civil society
organisations, as well as scientific, legal or
bioethical justifications in defence of dogmatic
religious positions. Within the wide range of these
organisations, Human Life International is cited
most frequently, as its influence extends to most
countries in the region. Women’s rights activists
noted that what characterised reactionary agency
against women’s rights was not the religious
status of the person ‘but rather their attempt to
influence public policy in defence of a conservative
religious and patriarchal agenda’.4 This also bears
evidence to the limitations of the religious vs
secular binary in understanding political dynamics
behind agendas advanced.
What the IDS workshop revealed is the lack of
conceptual clarity on the meaning of secularism
(see Sholkamy and Mir-Hosseini, this IDS
Bulletin). What does the separation of the church
and the state mean in practice? Kandiyoti
defines secular spaces:
as spaces where justifications for pluralism
and equality can be based on sources other
than religious doctrine (though they do not
exclude religion as a possible source). Those
wishing to use religious arguments to achieve
a more progressive reading of women’s rights
are de facto members of secular spaces since
feminists – of whatever persuasion – have
little to gain from a closure of public
deliberation. 
What the articles in this IDS Bulletin suggest, is
that secularism and democracy are often used
interchangeably in a way that denies the
historical incidence of secular systems denying
democracy.
For Appleby,5 it is the secularism of the West that
has become so hegemonic as to be exclusionary.
He is critical of ‘secular fundamentalists’ who
are the ‘dogmatists who proclaim the creed of
secularism, as if they were the sole bearers of
truth and righteousness’. According to Appleby,
secular fundamentalists are the ‘dogmatists who
proclaim the creed of secularism, as if they were
the sole bearers of truth and righteousness’ and
who will go to great length to crush any forms of
religion in the public sphere. On the other hand,
Sholkamy, writing from the perspectives of what
is happening in Egypt, suggests that it is the
religious that has become hegemonic and that
the cause and form of religiosity and its
relationship with piety and morality is highly
complex. The relationship between the religious,
the secular and pluralism also lies at the heart of
the debate. Some have argued that in social
orders where the religious becomes the
hegemonic, what emerges is a form of support
for communitarianism (under the premise that
this is the religion of the majority and it is what
the majority wish) under which those who
deviate from the religious normative values,
order, or ways are rejected.
The construction of the label ‘moderate Islam’
and pitting it against a radical/extremist Islam is
addressed by many authors in this IDS Bulletin
(e.g. Tadros, Mir-Hosseini, Patel). The term
moderate Islam was conveniently taken up by the
West post-9/11 to create a separate category of
Islamists – those movements which reject
violence as a means of accession to political
power. Moderate Islamists are in essence the
‘good Islamists’ who are believed to be the force
that will lead to the carpet being pulled from
underneath the feet of the extremists. Many
think tanks in the USA and Europe have pushed
for greater engagement with the ‘moderate’
Islamists. To justify this, their democratic
credentials have been widely promoted.
Interestingly, this has not involved highlighting
their democratic credentials vis-à-vis recognising
women’s full and equal citizenship – perhaps, as
Tadros suggests in this issue, because they do fall
short of even the modicum of rights
constitutionally guaranteed under existing
authoritarian regimes. Moderate in relation to
what and to whom is conveniently limited to a
comparison with the radical Islamists, as if these
were the only two politically viable options.
6 Towards a new research-policy praxis on
gender and religion
There is a sense of urgency in engaging with the
politics of international and local engagements
with gender and religion on the ground, not least
because the spaces to articulate alternative
voices and perspectives is narrowing in the post-
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9/11 context, in particular as those who wish to
distance themselves from claims to
Islamophobia. Possible charges of Islamophobia
lead to muting or censorship of any critical
reflection on the practices of Muslim
communities. Like the young feminist mentioned
above, whose voice in presenting on gender
issues was muted because she was not veiled and
therefore did not look authentic enough, so too,
there are incidents of denying voices in academia
and think tanks on the basis that their critiques
belie a sense of cultural sensitivity.
The discussions around critical conjunctures in
the politics of women, rights and Islam have
revealed the need to move beyond the abstract
and the polemic and the importance of
undertaking context-specific empirical work.
One of the limitations of this IDS Bulletin is that
the focus is specifically on the deployment of
religious discourses, actors and symbols in
relation to engagement in Muslim communities
in the Middle East and Asia as opposed to a
broader comparative focus. This is partly due to
the fact that the workshop held at IDS in
September followed on from the debates
generated in the first issue of the E-Contestations
Journal published by the Pathways of Women’s
Empowerment Consortium. In that issue of
Contestations, Sholkamy presented the
problematique of assuming a ‘Safe Islam’ through
which gender reform can be advanced. The
article was accompanied by a series of responses,
some of which were presented by authors who
have contributed to this IDS Bulletin. 
The focus on the deployment of religious actors
and representations by some policymakers in the
West is also partly in recognition of the fact that
the security and anti-terrorist agendas following
9/11 have been targeting ‘Muslim communities’
in particular. However, some of the issues raised
here also apply to other contexts and religions.
There is in fact a growing body of literature
debating the role of the Catholic Church in
influencing the gender agenda globally, but also
on the local–national levels and its implications
for women activist movements.6
It is hoped that the debates generated here will
inform a future research agenda that takes an
empirical approach to the study of gender and
religion in policy and practice. A research agenda
is already emerging, albeit embryonic, that
recognises the importance of studying ‘fluid
networks of influence at the global, national and
local levels and engagement with a multiplicity
of international, state and non-state actors’
(Kandiyoti, this IDS Bulletin). It recognises the
centrality of agency and the critical importance
of engaging with actors, interests and practices
(see Kandiyoti). It recognises that the study of
personal trajectories of actors engaged in
religious-political-intellectual dialectics is very
important (see Mir-Hosseini).
In the meantime, there are a series of critical
policy messages emerging from the case studies
in this IDS Bulletin that inform both analytical
approaches as well as practice. 
On an analytical level, the binaries of religious vs
secular, moderate Islamist vs radical Islamist,
feminist vs Muslim activist, should be suspended.
Such binaries conceal the ambiguities and
fluidity of identities, strategies of engagement
and framing of ideas. This is not to suggest that
ideological projects are not important, only that
the way in which actors exercise their agency vis-
à-vis different audiences and contexts does not fit
so neatly into one of two binaries, as
problematised by the various case studies
presented here.
In terms of policy frameworks, the discourse, and
the politics behind ‘engaging the Muslim world’
as if it were a homogenous category united by
religion, should be abandoned. Such a discourse
is highly essentialist and engages with men and
women assuming they only have one identity
marker – their religion. It also feeds into the
political agenda of the Islamists who insist that
all Muslims should be engaged with exclusively
as members in the Muslim Ummah.
On a praxis level, using religion as an entry point
in development should be recognised as one of a
series of possible approaches to community
engagement, and certainly not the only one, even
in communities where religion is an important
mobilising force. This is not to suggest that
religion should be ignored, only that people can
be engaged with in various capacities and
multiple identities (and not just their religious
one). Engagement through the religious
framework is one pathway to engaging with
gender issues, but it is not ultimately the goal,
which is gender justice.
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Finally, a feminist engagement with sacred texts,
which involves exposing patriarchal
underpinnings that inform dominant
interpretations and approaches should be
promoted as an end in itself. The benefits are
undoubtedly the production of a religious
scholarship that is more gender sensitive.
However, caution is needed in assuming that a
feminist re-engagement with religious text within
a religious framework is a panacea for altering
gender bias in laws, policies and practices. The
politics of transforming gender power hierarchies
may require strategies that go beyond dismantling
the patriarchal religious premises upon which
they were justified; and in some cases they may
not be, at the core, about gender at all.
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Notes
* I would like to thank Professor Deniz
Kandiyoti for her thorough and helpful review
of this introduction.
1 Interview by the author with Mozn Hassan,
Director of Nazra for Feminist Studies, Cairo,
July 2010.
2 Arbitrary divorce in return for foregoing some
financial rights.
3 Personal communication with Professor
Nabila Mourad, 27 October 2010.
4 Fundamentalist Strategy: The Secular and the




5 ‘Of Fundamentalisms, Secular or Otherwise’,




6 For a more recent reading of religion and
gender on a country level, Shahravi, R. and
Jennichen, A. (2010) Third World Quarterly 31.6,
offers case studies of the Catholic church’s
impact on the gender agenda in Mexico, Chile
and Poland.
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